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(Opinion Filed: October 14, 1999) 
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       Department of Law 
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       Pittsburgh PA 15219 
        Attorneys for Appellants 
 
       Samuel J. Cordes (argued) 
       Ogg, Jones, Cordes & Ignelzi 
       245 Fort Pitt Blvd. 
       Pittsburgh PA 15222 
        Attorney for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Nine police officers brought this employment 
discrimination action against the City of Pittsburgh. The 
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and 
judgment was entered accordingly. For the reasons 
explained below, we affirm. 
 
I. 
 
A. In 1992, the City of Pittsburgh (the "City") offered an 
early retirement incentive to its police officers. This 
incentive permitted any officer who was 50 years old and 
had completed 25 years of service to retire with a monthly 
pension benefit equal to 75% of his or her average monthly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*The Honorable David D. Dowd, Jr., United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. 
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pay, if the employee retired by December 31, 1995. Nearly 
50% of the City's police force qualified for the benefit. 
 
Recognizing that the usual process of selecting police 
officers took well over a year, the City began to develop 
plans to replace the large number of experienced police 
officers that it was about to lose to early retirement. To that 
end, the City enacted an ordinance--which later became 
known as "Ordinance 26"--that authorized the City to hire 
certified, experienced police officers without following the 
procedures outlined in Pennsylvania's General Civil Service 
Statute, 53 Pa.C.S.A. S 23431 et seq., or the Policemen's 
Civil Service Statute, 53 Pa.C.S.A. S 23531 et seq. Perhaps 
most significantly, Ordinance 26 authorized the City to hire 
experienced police officers without ranking applicants on 
eligibility lists through civil service testing. 
 
The Fraternal Order of Police challenged the validity of 
Ordinance 26 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 
County, arguing that it violated Pennsylvania law. Fraternal 
Order of Police v. City of Pittsburgh, 644 A.2d 246 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1994). The court agreed and issued an order 
enjoining the City from hiring certified police officers under 
Ordinance 26 unless those officers were ranked after 
competitive testing. 
 
Although the City appealed this order and ultimately 
prevailed on appeal, it had an urgent need to hire 
experienced police officers to replace the retiring officers. 
Rather than waiting for the appeal to be resolved, the City 
complied with the order and administered a written 
examination to all of the officers who had applied for 
positions under the provisions of Ordinance 26. 
 
The City, however, was concerned that ranking 
applicants according to their performance on a written 
examination, as required by the court order, might unfairly 
prejudice African-American applicants. In response to this 
concern, the mayor and the city council adopted a new 
hiring procedure designed to give the City "greater flexibility 
in creating a police force that reflect's (sic) our overall 
population." App. at 1113. 
 
The new hiring procedure, like the one it replaced, 
required applicants to take a written examination. As 
 
                                3 
  
before, the City ranked applicants according to their 
performance on the written examination and anticipated 
extending offers of employment according to each 
applicant's rank. The new procedure, however, added a new 
component to the application process; it required 
applicants to take an oral examination. 
 
The oral examinations were administered by various 
three-member panels appointed by the Police Bureau of the 
City's Department of Public Safety. The oral examination 
panels scored each applicant on a pass/fail basis. Any 
applicant could be eliminated from consideration, 
regardless of his or her performance on the written 
examination, if the panel determined that the applicant 
"failed" the oral examination. The oral examination panels 
did not ask a pre-determined series of questions, or even 
follow a routine set of procedures, in administering the exam.1 
In effect, therefore, each panel had complete and 
unreviewable discretion to decide who, among the 
otherwise-qualified applicants, would become eligible to 
receive offers of employment from the City. 
 
Applicants who passed both examinations were 
considered "certified" for employment as police officers. 
Their names, along with information about their written 
examination ranking, race, and gender, were then 
presented to the City's Director of Public Safety. The 
Director of Public Safety hired applicants according to rank. 
However, the Director had complete discretion to 
"undercut" any applicant who had been certified for 
employment, regardless of that applicant's rank. 
 
B. The plaintiffs are nine white police officers  who 
performed well on the written examination but were denied 
employment after failing the oral examination. They 
brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. SS 1981 and 
1983, alleging that the City had discriminated against them 
on the basis of race. Specifically, they alleged that the City 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The panel members evaluated each applicant on the basis of five 
personal attributes: "speaking," "interpersonal relations," "problem 
sensing and solving," "motivation," "listening," and "overall 
suitability." 
See App. at 198-207. 
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had used its new hiring procedure, and particularly the oral 
examination, to discriminate against white applicants. 
 
Several weeks before trial, the City filed a motion for 
summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs had 
insufficient evidence to prove that they had been subjected 
to racial discrimination. The District Court denied that 
motion. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs had made 
out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and the Court stated that the 
City had not "put forth evidence of a legitimate, non- 
discriminatory reason for the failure to hire, or why the 
plaintiffs failed the oral portion of the test." 6/1/98 Tr. at 
3. In addition, the Court stated that there was"sufficient 
evidence that the proffered reasons [were] a pretext." Id. 
 
During the jury selection process, the City questioned 
why the plaintiffs used one of their peremptory challenges 
against an African-American on the jury panel. After 
considering the reasons offered by plaintiffs for striking the 
potential juror, the District Court concluded that the 
peremptory challenge was nondiscriminatory. The City 
made no further objection. 
 
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case at trial, the City 
moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 50, arguing that the plaintiffs had not introduced 
sufficient evidence to support their claim of racial 
discrimination. The City renewed that motion at the close of 
all of the evidence. The District Court denied the motion in 
both instances. 
 
During the jury charge conference, the plaintiffs offered-- 
as a means to simplify the jury instructions--to permit the 
case to go to the jury using only the liability standard 
applicable under 42 U.S.C. S 1981. At that time, the City 
asked the Court to instruct the jury that Pittsburgh could 
be found liable only if the alleged discrimination was 
carried out pursuant to a policy, practice, or custom 
adopted by the City. The District Court denied that request. 
 
Following trial, the jury found that the City had 
discriminated against each plaintiff on the basis of his race 
and awarded back pay. The District Court also awarded the 
plaintiffs prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney fees, 
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and ordered the City to offer the plaintiffs employment as 
police officers, contingent upon their successful completion 
of a physical and psychological examination. In addition, 
the Court ordered the City to provide front pay until the 
plaintiffs were either offered employment or failed their 
physical or psychological examinations. The City appealed. 
 
II. 
 
The City raises five arguments on appeal. We will discuss 
each in turn. 
 
A. First, the City argues that the judgment should  be 
reversed because the District Court erred in applying the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Specifically, 
the City maintains that because the plaintiffs are white 
males, the District Court should have required them"to 
meet a heightened standard in making out a prima facie 
case."2 Br. for Appellant at 19. 
 
At this juncture, however, the City's argument is 
foreclosed by United States Postal Service Board of 
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-15 (1983). As the 
Eleventh Circuit has put it, under Aikens," `[w]hen the 
defendant fails to persuade the district court to dismiss the 
action for lack of a prima facie case, and responds to the 
plaintiff 's proof by offering evidence of the reason for the 
plaintiff 's rejection the factfinder must then decide whether 
the rejection was discriminatory' and the question whether 
the plaintiff made out a prima facie case is no longer 
relevant." Tidwell v. Carter Products, 135 F.3d 1422, 1426 
n.1 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-15); 
see also J.A. Beaver v. Rayonier, Inc., 1999 WL 709991, at 
*4 (11th Cir. Sept. 13, 1999). 
 
B. Second, the City argues that the District Court  erred 
in denying the City's Rule 50 motion because the jury's 
finding of intentional racial discrimination was not 
supported by the evidence.3 We must affirm unless we find 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. But see Iadimarco v. Runyon, 1999 WL 692709, at *12-17 (3d Cir., 
Sept. 8, 1999) (rejecting similar argument). 
 
3. The City also argues that the District Court erred in denying its 
motion for summary judgment. Since the case proceeded to trial, 
however, our review is limited to the District Court's denial of the 
City's 
Rule 50 motion. See Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 533 
n.3 (3d Cir. 1976). 
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that the record is critically deficient of that minimum 
quantity of evidence from which a jury might reasonably 
afford relief. See Link v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 
Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 921 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework, once 
the plaintiffs were found to have made out a prima facie 
case, the burden shifted to the City to present evidence of 
a non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision. 
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Fuentes v. Perskie, 
32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). To meet this burden, the 
City called witnesses who testified that the City did not hire 
the plaintiffs because, although they were otherwise 
qualified, they did not pass the oral examination. The City 
also presented evidence that the oral examination 
procedure was designed to "minimize, if not eliminate" any 
"adverse impact" that written examinations might have on 
African-American applicants. See Br. for Pittsburgh at 31. 
 
Once the City introduced this evidence, the burden of 
production shifted back to the plaintiffs to "point to some 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder 
could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's 
articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an 
invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a 
motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. Here, the plaintiffs presented the 
following evidence to show that the City's explanation of its 
hiring decisions was pretextual. They offered evidence 
showing that the written examination that the City 
administered prior to 1992 was not culturally biased and 
was a powerful predictor of job performance. See  App. at 
730-31, 867, 913. They also presented evidence showing 
that (1) the City refused to explain why any of the plaintiffs 
failed the oral examination; (2) the City kept records of each 
applicant's race throughout the hiring process, see App. at 
385, 387, 389, 395, 1116, 1120; (3) the City initially 
planned to fail 15% of the applicants who made it to the 
oral examination phase, then raised that number to 35% in 
an attempt to hire fewer white applicants, see  App. at 733- 
37; (4) the City undercut 29 white applicants who passed 
all of their examinations, but did not undercut any 
similarly situated African-American applicants, see App. at 
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1229; and (5) while the City failed many white applicants 
who performed well on the written examination, it failed 
very few African-Americans who performed poorly on the 
written examination, see App. at 1225-28, 1214-17, 147. 
 
Having reviewed the record on appeal, we conclude that 
a reasonable factfinder could find that the City's 
explanation of its hiring decisions was pretextual. 
 
C. Third, the City argues that the District Court erred in 
sending this case to the jury since 42 U.S.C. S 1981 does 
not provide for a private right of action against 
municipalities. However, we need not resolve this issue 
because the City failed to raise it before the jury returned 
its verdict. To be sure, the City submitted a Rule 50 motion 
at the close of the plaintiffs' case and later renewed that 
motion at the close of all of the evidence. See  App. at 665- 
66. But in moving for judgment as a matter of law, the City 
did not challenge the plaintiffs' right to sue Pittsburgh 
under 42 U.S.C. S 1981. See id. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the City waived its right to raise this argument. See 
Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 752 F.2d 
802, 814 (3d Cir. 1984) ("If the issue was not raised in the 
motion for the directed verdict at the close of all the 
evidence, it is improper to grant the JNOV on that issue."). 
 
D. Fourth, the City argues that the District Court  erred 
in finding that the plaintiffs' decision to exclude juror 
number 153, an African-American, was not discriminatory. 
We may not disturb that finding unless we are persuaded 
that the District Court committed clear error. See 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 353 (1991). 
 
When the City objected to the plaintiffs' decision to 
exclude juror number 153, the plaintiffs offered a non- 
discriminatory explanation for their decision, viz., that they 
had decided to exercise their peremptory strikes against 
government employees and against individuals who had 
been involved in discrimination lawsuits. Because juror 
number 153 was a government employee who had been 
involved in a discrimination lawsuit, she was a likely 
candidate for exclusion. The District Court accepted this 
explanation as non-discriminatory. After this point, the City 
voiced no further objection. 
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The City now argues that "the race-neutral and facially 
valid reason" put forward by the plaintiffs "was, as a matter 
of fact, a mere pretext for actual discriminatory intent." 
United States v. Umaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 
1994); see Br. for Appellants at 53. In support of that 
argument, the City points out that the plaintiffs did not 
strike juror number 200, a government employee, but 
instead struck juror number 22, who was not a government 
employee and had not been involved in a discrimination 
lawsuit, simply because plaintiffs' counsel "just didn't like 
[her]." App. at 306; see also Br. for Appellants at 53. This 
apparent inconsistency, the City argues, shows that the 
plaintiffs' explanation for their decision to strike juror 
number 153 was pretextual. 
 
We are not persuaded that the plaintiffs' failure to strike 
juror number 200 (the government employee) instead of 
juror number 153 is sufficient to show that the District 
Court's finding was clearly erroneous. An attorney with a 
general plan to strike jurors who have a certain 
characteristic (such as jurors who are government 
employees or jurors with prior involvement in a 
discrimination suit) may decide, as the attorney's 
peremptory challenges dwindle, that it is more important to 
strike a juror who lacks this characteristic but who seems 
unappealing for some other, more compelling reason. On 
the record before us, we cannot find clear error. 
 
E. Finally, the City argues that the District Cour t erred 
in instructing the jury on the issue of municipal liability. 
The issue of whether a jury instruction misstates the 
proper legal standard is subject to plenary review. See 
Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1445 
(3d Cir. 1996). We need not reverse, however, if we 
conclude that "the jury would have reached the same result 
had it been instructed according to the correct legal 
standard." Murray v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 145 
F.3d 143, 156 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
The City argues that the District Court's municipal 
liability instruction disregarded the principles set out in 
Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 
U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, the Supreme Court held that in 
actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, 
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municipalities cannot be held liable under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior but may be held liable "when execution 
of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its 
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be 
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury." Id. at 
694. 
 
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court explained that 
"identification of those officials whose decisions represent 
the official policy of the local government unit is itself a 
legal question to be resolved by the trial judge before the 
case is submitted to the jury." Jett v. Dallas Indep. School 
District, 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). However,"[o]nce those 
officials who have the power to make official policy on a 
particular issue have been identified, it is for the jury to 
determine whether their decisions have caused the 
deprivation of rights at issue by policies which affirmatively 
command that it occur, or by acquiescence in a 
longstanding practice or custom . . . ." Id . (internal citations 
omitted). 
 
During the jury charge conference in this case, the City 
asked the District Court to instruct the jury that the City 
could not be held liable unless the discriminatory action 
resulted from to an official policy, custom, or practice of the 
City. See App. at 977-80. The District Court denied the 
City's request and instructed the jury as follows: 
 
       When a City government is involved, of course, it may 
       act only through natural persons as its agents or 
       employees. And, in general, any agent or employee of 
       the City may bind the City by his acts and declarations 
       made while acting within the scope of his authority 
       delegated to him by the City, or within the scope of 
       his duties as an employee of the City. 
 
App. at 1068 (emphasis added). 
 
In light of Monell and its progeny, this instruction was 
erroneous because it suggested that the City could be held 
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior and 
therefore failed to inform the jury that the City could be 
held liable for the oral examination panels' decisions only if 
the city "caused the deprivation of rights at issue by 
policies which affirmatively command that it occur." Jett, 
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491 U.S. at 737. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argue that the 
error was harmless since the City never contested the 
plaintiffs' allegation that the oral examination panels made 
hiring decisions according to policies adopted by the City.4 
This approach by the City, the plaintiffs argue, rendered 
the instruction harmless. 
 
We agree. This was not a case in which the plaintiffs had 
strong evidence that a lower level municipal employee had 
committed a constitutional violation, and the municipality 
contended that the employee's actions did not result from 
any municipal policy or custom. Rather, this was a case in 
which the plaintiffs focused directly on the City's policies, 
argued that those policies were designed to produce 
discrimination, and asked the jury to infer that the oral 
examination panels whose decisions are at issue followed 
the City's allegedly discriminatory policies. See, e.g., App. at 
1017-64 (plaintiffs' closing argument). The City contested 
only the plaintiffs' allegation that the City's hiring policies 
were discriminatory; it never argued that the oral 
examination panels departed from those policies. See, e.g., 
App. at 1015 (defendants' closing argument) ("[This case is 
about the City designing and implementing a system that 
tries to select the best qualified applicants . . . ."); see also 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, App. at 70 (referring to the hiring 
procedures at issue as "the City of Pittsburgh's custom, 
practice, and/or policy"). 
 
For these reasons, it is apparent that the District Court's 
municipal liability instruction, although erroneous, could 
not have affected the outcome of this case. See Murray, 145 
F.3d at 156 ("[W]e will not reverse a judgment where `it is 
highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The plaintiffs actually raised this argument during the jury charge 
conference. They suggested that the instruction proposed by the City 
was not necessary since the City had never argued that the oral 
examination panels' decisions were contrary to the City's official 
policies, 
customs, or practices. See App. at 979 ("It would just be our position in 
this kind of case, where it's clearly a person was either fired or not by 
someone with the authority, final authority of the City to do it [sic]. It 
makes no practical difference [whether the Court gives such an 
instruction here]."). 
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judgment.' ") (quoting McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 
779 F.2d 916, 924 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also 11 Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure S 2886, at 
467-70 (2d ed. 1995) ("Errors in instructions routinely are 
ignored if . . . [it] is apparent that the error could not have 
changed the result."). Accordingly, we conclude that the 
District Court's error was harmless. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 
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